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~~SECRET~~Attachment A. Grain Harvest

I. Soviet Grain Harvest

A. 1956

1. On the basis of the reported 25% increase in grain production in 1956 over 1955, it is probable that the official Soviet estimate of grain production (bare yield) in 1956 is around 124 million tons. W/AG has not attempted to make any estimate of the 1956 biological production and does not believe much can be gained by such an exercise since there can be significant year to year variations in the percentage difference between biological production and bare production.

2. However, W/AG believes that as a result of abnormally high post harvest losses, especially in the New Lands area, the quantity of grain available for utilization was only about 115 mil. m. t. This is the production figure for 1956 which is comparable to the 103 mil. ton production estimate for 1955.

B. 1957

1. W/AG's estimate for the 1957 harvest remains at about 100 million tons, roughly the 1955 level of production. Khrushchev's statement ^{8/} that the 1957 grain procurement by November 1 was 120 percent of that of the same date in 1955 (32.9 mil. tons delivered in 1955) indicates that procurement this year has been about 35-40 million tons or less than three quarters that of the 1956 procurement (54 mil. m. t.). Grain production also was admitted by Khrushchev to be lower than last year.

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The percentage drop in production is unlikely to have been so great as the percentage drop in procurement since portions of the New Lands area, which give up a very high proportion of their crop to the state had poor weather. In Kazakhstan procurements as of Sept. 20 were only 258 million poods, about one fourth of the total 1956 procurement from Kazakhstan. The 1957 procurement roughly approximates the 1955 procurement level.

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SECRET**Attachment A. Grain Harvest****II. Ukraine Grain Harvest - 1955 and 1956**

1. Official Soviet sources give the following information on the 1955 and 1956 Ukraine grain harvests.

Table I

	<u>1955</u>			<u>1956</u>		
	(mill.bns)	Avg.	Production	(mill.bns)	Yield	Production
	(c/bns)	(c/bns)	(mill.bns.)	(c/bns)	(c/bns)	(mill.bns.)
Total Grain	21.7 3/ s/		32.8 3/ s/	19.6 3/ s/		23.4 3/ s/
Corn	4.8 3/ s/	s/	8.6 3/ s/	5.0 3/ s/	s/	7.3 3/ s/
Small Grains	16.9 3/ s/	14.3	24.2 3/ s/	14.6 3/ s/	11.0	16.1 3/ s/

2. The small grain yields for 1955 and 1956 computed in the above table do not appear to be unreasonable.

By differences

3/ Corn production reported to be 26.3% of total grains production. 3/
The 1957 planned harvest was 1.8 million loads, 4/ which was said to be
50% greater than the 1956 crops. 5/
6/ Corn production reported to be 31% of total grain production. 6/
The corn area given here is reportedly "corn for grain". The reported
corn production figures most likely include not only dry grain but also
corn ears harvested and boiled in the immature stage and converted to
dry grain equivalent. Thus it is probable that the "corn production"
figures include production from an area greater than officially reported.
For this reason it is not advisable to compute a yield on the basis of the
reported information.

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The 1955 yield of 14.3 c/ha (21 bu/acre) fits in with the very favorable comments on the harvest by the U.S. Ag. delegation when they visited the Ukraine in the summer of 1955.

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3.

4. It is possible that the corn production figures reported by the Soviets are the result of some statistical manipulation, e.g., a faulty conversion of immature corn ears to a dry grain equivalent. As noted above there is no firm area figure from which a firm yield per hectare may be computed. All that can be said is that the 1955 yield must have been less than 18 c/ha per hectare (30 bu/acre). A yield only slightly less than this would not appear out of line with the small grain yield of about 14 c/ha.

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~~SECRET~~Attachment B. Mineral Deposits in Soviet Agriculture

The unprecedented formation of 674 new state farms in the first half of the year have tended to further enlarge the position of state farms in Soviet Agriculture. State farms have become an increasingly important sector of Soviet agriculture since the initiation of the New Lands program in 1954, and now account for more than a quarter of the total sown acreage as compared with approximately 12 percent in 1953. Conversely, the role of collective farms, still the largest and most important sector of agriculture has decreased somewhat. However, this development does not necessarily portend a continuing trend resulting in the dominance of state farms, and Soviet agricultural officials have denied a big switch to state farms.

Although state farms are proclaimed to be the highest form of organization in socialist agriculture, the current emphasis on the role of state farms does not appear to be based solely, or even primarily, on this ideological prepossession. Instead, it appears that this enhanced stature of state farms may be explained largely in terms of the current trends and programs in Soviet agriculture. Many of the state farms organized during 1957 were organized in the remote steppe areas of Kazakhstan, Siberia, and the Volga areas. The organization of state farms in these areas thus appears to be an extension of the policy of relying heavily on state farms for the development of virgin land.

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In those areas, as well as in more highly developed regions, state farms were also formed on the basis of existing farming units which had proved unsatisfactory. Included in these uneconomic farm units were "backward" collective farms with excessive land resources, and small farms under the jurisdiction of various industrial ministries.

Other state farms arose from implementation of the Sixth Five Year Plan directive to establish specialized dairy and vegetable state farms for supplying the urban population, development of the Volodarsk Steppe and other irrigation schemes in Central Asia, and increased production of citrus, tea, and other specialty crops.

Although the organization of 674 state farms in a six month period ^{recent} to without parallel in Soviet agriculture, the resulting institutional structure should not be viewed as final or fixed. The institutional structure of Soviet agriculture has been subjected to continual modification in the past, and will probably continue to be the subject of experimentation. From 1951 to 1956, inclusive, 1,053 new state farms were formed (including the 405 new grain state farms organized in the New Lands), but during the same period of time 912 state farms were liquidated, with the result that the number of state farms increased by 111 during the six year period. Growth over the next few years may well result in a similar growth pattern. In any event, there is as yet no evidence that Soviet leaders intend to convert the bulk of collective farms into state farms by 1960, as had sometimes been reported.

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a copy of M/A's
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FROM:		SACR	
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REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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